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Abstract
We consider a dynamic general equilibrium model with incomplete mar-
kets in which we derive conditions for separating the savings decision from
the asset allocation decision. It is shown that with logarithmic utility func-
tions this separation holds for any heterogeneity of discount factors while the
generalization to constant relative risk aversion only holds for homogeneous
discount factors. Our results have simple asset pricing implications for the
time series and also the cross section of asset prices. It is found that on data
from the DJIA a risk aversion weaker than in the logarithmic case fits best.
1 Introduction
Ever since Tobin (1958) financial economists have been interested in conditions
that help to simplify portfolio allocation problems. A great simplification is
achieved by those conditions that allow to structure portfolio decisions in two
stages: First, deciding how to split one’s wealth between a risk-free and a mu-
tual fund of risky assets, and then to allocate among the risky assets within the
mutual fund. This separation property is known as two-fund separation, or more
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specifically, since one of the funds is assumed to be risk-free, as monetary separa-
tion. By now the conditions for two-fund separation are well-known. The seminal
paper in this area is Cass and Stiglitz (1970) out of which an impressive litera-
ture developed that is too large to be reviewed here in detail. Instead, we refer
to Russel (1980) and standard textbooks like Gollier (2001), Huang and Litzen-
berger (1988), Ingersoll (1987), and Magill and Quinzii (1996). While the finance
literature on two-fund separation considers asset returns as exogenously given
the general equilibrium literature derives two-fund separation with endogenously
determined returns. For example Detemple and Gottardi (1998) derive two-fund
separation in a two-period general equilibrium models and Judd, Kubler, and
Schmedders (2004) have recently extended the two-fund separation literature to
dynamic general equilibrium models.
While in this paper we use the same dynamic general equilibrium methodology
as in Judd et al. (2004), we are interested in a different separation property that
also simplifies intertemporal asset allocation problems. In a T-period model
we study the conditions for separating between consumption and investments
in (risky) assets, which we call T-period fund separation. One may argue that
this separation is even more fundamental than the monetary separation, because
before one can decide on how to allocate wealth among (risky) assets one has to
decide how much to invest and how much to consume.
Separation properties can be derived from conditions on agent’s preferences
(Cass and Stiglitz (1970), Detemple and Gottardi (1998), and Judd et al. (2004)
and others), or from conditions on the assets’ return distributions. As in Cass
and Stiglitz (1970), Detemple and Gottardi (1998), and Judd et al. (2004) and
others, we do not restrict return distributions but seek for conditions on agents’
preferences. Moreover, as it is also standard in this literature, we assume that
all agents are discounted expected utility maximizers sharing the same beliefs
on the assets’ return. Given these assumptions conditions for fund separation
do restrict the heterogeneity of the agents’ type of risk aversion and possibly
also the heterogeneity of their discount rates. Our first result shows that T-
period fund separation holds for any heterogneous discount factors if all agents
have logarithmic utility functions. In the case of non-unit constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA), T-period fund separation is shown to hold if and only if agent’s
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discount factors are identical. These results generalize Hens, Reimann, and Vogt
(2004) to more than two periods. Moreover, they show that in contrast to the
two-period case, with T-periods fund separation fails for non-unit CRRA with
heterogeneous discount factors. An intuition for this new finding comes from
the observation that only in the case of logarithmic utility dynamic optimization
reduces to two-period optimization (see e.g. Hakansson (1970)).
Besides giving conditions for intertemporal fund separation our results are
also interesting because they relate to various strands of literature. Our results
for the logarithmic case give a general equilibrium foundation to the literature on
growth-optimal portfolios. See for example Kelly (1956), Breiman (1961), Thorp
(1971), Algoet and Cover (1988), Hakansson and Ziemba (1995) and references
therein. That is to say in contrast to the standard optimal growth literature, in
our model asset prices and hence market values and returns are endogeneized and
explained by the exogenous dividend process of the assets. Moreover, under sta-
tionarity assumptions on the dividend process we derive the well-known “fix-mix”
portfolio rule, giving also a general equilibrium foundation to the literature as for
example, Perold and Sharpe (1988), Mulvey and Ziemba (1998), Browne (1998),
and Dempster (2002), Dempster, Germano, Medova, and Villaverde (2003).
Our result for the logarithmic case connects nicely to the asset pricing liter-
ature which is one of the most important applications of fund separation. The
literature on asset pricing is also quite impressive and too large to be reviewed
here in detail. The interested reader may consult Campbell (2000) and Hirshleifer
(2001) for two recent surveys. From a dynamic general equilibrium point of view
the art of constructing asset pricing models is to find an optimal balance between
very general models without well structured preferences and a large degree of
heterogeneity on the one hand and very specific models with overly simplified
preferences and homogeneity of consumers on the other hand. In the first case
anything can happen while in the second case asset pricing puzzles arise. Fund
separation is an important tool in this respect since it allows for heterogeneity
of consumers while keeping the aggregate simple. Indeed, two-fund separation
builds the foundation of the capital asset pricing model and T-period fund sep-
aration is important for the time series and cross section properties of relative
asset prices. Our result shows that in a dynamic general equilibrium, relative
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market values of assets are determined by relative dividends of assets. Valuation
formulas for economies with CRRA are well known in the finance literature. See
Roll (1973), Kraus and Litzenberger (1975) and Rubinstein (1976). Note how-
ever, that in contrast to the standard finance literature our valuation formulas
are expressed solely in terms of exogenous characteristics of the economy like
the dividend process, the degree of risk aversion and the time preference. While
our asset pricing implication of logarithmic preferences has recently also been
derived by Evstigneev, Hens, and Schenk-Hoppe´ (1998) based on an evolution-
ary portfolio selection model, our result for the case of non-logarithmic utility
generalizes this asset pricing implication to any degree of constant relative risk
aversion. This generalization allows us to test the log versus the non-log CRRA-
case on stock market data. For quarterly data from 1992 to 2004 on dividends
and market values of stocks from the DJIA we find that a coefficient of relative
risk aversion around 0.65 fits best, i.e., asset prices would suggest a weaker degree
of risk aversion than in the logarithmic case (CRRA=1). This finding contrasts
with the asset pricing literature working on aggregate data instead of individual
stocks (cf. Mehra and Prescott (1985) and Kocherlakota (1996), for example)
which finds a much stronger degree of risk aversion than in the logarithmic case.
Finally, we show that our heterogenous agent economy can equivalently be
described by a single representative consumer whose demand function determines
equilibrium asset prices for any exogenously given future dividend process. This
aggregation property is weaker than full demand aggregation but far stronger
than than the usual notion of a representative consumer whose portfolio deci-
sion problem generates asset prices for any given dividend process, but whose
optimization problem fails to explain how asset prices change on changing the
exogenous characteristics of the economy (here, the dividend process).
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the
dynamic general equilibrium model. Section 3 provides an analysis of T-period
fund separation under constant relative risk aversion and in Section 4 we present
the results from an empirical test of our model.
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2 The Model
We consider a standard multiperiod finance economy. There are T + 1 periods
t = 0, . . . , T, and S states of nature, where S is finite.1 Uncertainty is modelled
by an information filtration
F = (F0, F1, . . . , FT ),
where each Ft is a partition of the set of states {1, . . . , S} and
(i) F0 = {{1, . . . , S}},
(ii) FT = {{1}, . . . , {S}},
(iii) Ft+1 is finer than Ft for all t = 0 . . . , T − 1, i.e.
ξt ∈ Ft and ξt+1 ∈ Ft+1 ⇒ ξt+1 ⊂ ξt or ξt+1 ∩ ξt = ∅.
Each element ξt of Ft is a date-t event. Let
D = {ξt | ξt ∈ Ft for some t = 0, 1, . . . T}
be the set of all events and let d = #D. By D+ we denote the set of non-initial
events, i.e.
D+ = D \ ξ0,
and by D− we denote the set of non-terminal events, i.e.
D− = D \ FT .
The unique ξt ∈ Ft with ξt ⊃ ξt+1 is called the immediate predecessor of ξt+1 ∈
Ft+1, t ≤ T − 1. The immediate predecessor of ξ ∈ D+ is denoted by ξ−. Let
pi(ξT ) > 0 be the probability of ξT ∈ FT . Then, for all t = 0, . . . , T , pi defines a
probability measure on Ft, which we also denote by pi, via
pi(ξt) =
∑
ξT⊂ξt
pi(ξT ).
1Since there is asset trade in all but the last period only, we call the model a “T -period
model.”
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For x ∈ Rd and any t ∈ {0, . . . , T} we denote by xt the vector in R#Ft that
takes values x(ξt), ξt ∈ Ft.2
There are K assets k = 1, . . . , K, which pay off a dividend per share at the
beginning of every period before trade takes place in this period. Dk(ξ) ≥ 0 is
the dividend paid by asset k in event ξ ∈ D. By D(ξ) = (D1(ξ), . . . , DK(ξ)) we
denote the vector of dividend payments of all assets in event ξ. We assume that
aggregate dividends are strictly positive, i.e.
D(ξ) :=
K∑
k=1
Dk(ξ) > 0 for all ξ ∈ D.
There are I investors i = 1, . . . , I. Each investor is characterized by her
initial endowment of assets θ¯i ∈ RK and by her utility function U i : Rd+ → R,
respectively U i : Rd++ → R. We assume that asset endowments are collinear,
i.e. there exists θ¯ ∈ RK such that θ¯i = δiθ¯ for all i, where δi > 0 for all i and∑
i δ
i = 1. The aggregate endowment θ¯ is normalized so that θ¯k = 1 for all
k. Moreover, we assume that U i has expected utility form, i.e. there exist von
Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions uit : R+ → R, respectively uit : R++ → R,
for all t = 0, . . . , T , such that
U i(c) = E
[
T∑
t=0
uit(ct)
]
, for all c ∈ Rd+ (resp. c ∈ Rd++),
where the expectation is taken with respect to the probability measure pi. In-
vestors have no endowment in periods t > 0. Hence, any positive consumption in
periods t > 0 is generated by an intertemporal transfer of wealth through trade
on the asset market.
Investors can trade in the K assets in each non-terminal event. For each ξ ∈
D− let λik(ξ) be the proportion of wealth agent i invests in asset k ∈ {1, . . . , K}
in event ξ, and let λi0(ξ) denote the proportion of wealth i consumes in ξ. We
assume that
∑K
k=0 λ
i
k(ξ) = 1 for all ξ ∈ D−. The investment strategy of agent i
then is given by λi = (λik(ξ)) ξ∈D−
k=0,...,K
.
2Alternatively, we can interpret xt as an Ft-measurable function xt : {1, . . . , S} → R,
i.e. xt(s) = xt(s′) whenever s, s′ ∈ ξt for some ξt ∈ Ft.
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3 T-Period Fund Separation
Let qk(ξ) > 0 denote the price of asset k in event ξ ∈ D−. It is convenient to
define qk(ξT ) := 0 for all terminal events ξT ∈ FT and all k. Let wi(ξ) be investor
i’s wealth in event ξ ∈ D. Then wi0 := wi(ξ0) = (D0+q0)θ¯i, and for all ξt+1 ∈ Ft+1
and t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
wi(ξt+1) = w
i(ξt)
K∑
k=1
Dk(ξt+1) + q
k(ξt+1)
qk(ξt)
λik(ξt),
= . . .
= wi0
t∏
τ=0
[
K∑
k=1
Dk(ξτ+1) + q
k(ξτ+1)
qk(ξτ )
λik(ξτ )
]
,
where ξτ is the unique predecessor of ξt+1 at period τ . Investor i’s consumption
ci ∈ Rd+ is a function of her investment strategy λi and asset prices q and is given
by
ci(λi, q)(ξt) = λ
i
0(ξt)w
i(ξt)
for all ξt ∈ Ft and for all t = 0, . . . , T , where we define λi0(ξT ) := 1 for all ξT ∈ FT .
For given asset prices q, investor i solves
max U i(ci(λi, q))
s.t.
∑K
k=0 λ
i
tk = 1 for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
(1)
Since assets are in unit supply market clearing requires that for all k = 1, . . . , K,
and for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
qkt =
I∑
i=1
λitkw
i
t.
A competitive equilibrium is defined as follows:
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Definition 3.1 A profile of investment strategies λ = (λi)i together with asset
prices q is a competitive equilibrium, if
1. U i(ci(λi, q)) ≥ U i(ci(λ˜i, q)) for all investment strategies λ˜i and all i =
1, . . . , I, and
2. (Market clearing) qkt =
∑I
i=1 λ
i
tkw
i
t for all k = 1, . . . , K, and for all
t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
From now on we assume that uit exhibits constant relative risk aversion (CRRA)
η > 0, i.e. uit = β
t
i uη for all t = 0, . . . , T , where βi, 0 < βi ≤ 1, is a discount
factor, and uη : R+ → R (respectively uη : R++ → R for η = 1) is given by
uη(c) =

1
1− η c
1−η , η 6= 1
ln(c) , η = 1
.
Given the properties of uη the optimization problem (1) has a unique interior
solution. Moreover, the first order condition is necessary and sufficient for a
solution and it is given by
qkt =
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−ti Et
[(
cit
ciτ
)η
ciτ
cit+1
λit+1,0
(
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
)]
, (2)
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and all k = 1, . . . , K, where Et[·] denotes the expectation
conditional on the sigma-algebra induced by the partition Ft (see Appendix A
for a derivation of (2)).
We are interested in the question, whether in equilibrium all investors invest
in the same mutual fund, whenever they have the same constant relative risk
aversion but differ with respect to their time preference and asset endowment.
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Definition 3.2 A competitive equilibrium (λ, q) is an equilibrium with T-
period fund separation, if there exists (λ¯tk)k=1,...,K
t=0,...,T−1
with
∑K
k=1 λ¯tk = 1 for all
t = 0, . . . , T − 1, such that for all i,
λitk =
(
1− λit0
)
λ¯tk for all k = 1, . . . , K.
Hence, in an equilibrium with T-period fund separation the proportion of non-
consumed wealth invested into any asset k is the same across all investors. For
unit CRRA we obtain the following result:
Theorem 3.1 If all investors have constant relative risk aversion equal to 1,
then there exists a unique equilibrium with T-period fund separation (λ, q), which
is given by
λit0 =
1− βi
1− βT+1−ti
,
λ¯tk =
1∑
j
(
βt+1j −βT+1j
1−βT+1j
δj
) T∑
τ=t+1
(∑
j
βτj − βτ+1j
1− βT+1j
δj
)
Et[dkτ ],
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, for all k = 1, . . . , K and for all i, where
dkt :=
Dkt
Dt
denotes the relative dividend paid by asset k in period t. Equilibrium prices q are
given by
qkt = Dt
1∑
j
(
βtj−βt+1j
1−βT+1j
δj
) T∑
τ=t+1
(∑
j
βτj − βτ+1j
1− βT+1j
δj
)
Et[dkτ ],
for all k = 1, . . . , K, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
The proof is in Appendix A. By Theorem 3.1 under logarithmic utility all agents
hold the same portfolio of assets and the proportion of wealth each agent invests
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into asset k is given by some weighted sum of the expected relative dividend
paid by this asset in the future. Observe, however, that agents have different
consumption rates which increase over time. Moreover, as expected, consumption
rates are increasing in the agent’s impatience: the smaller an agent’s discount
factor, the higher the proportion of wealth she consumes in each period.
The following corollaries immediately follow from Theorem 3.1:
Corollary 3.1 (Homogeneity) If all consumers have the same discount factor,
i.e. βi = β for all i, then
λ¯tk =
1
βt+1 − βT+1
T∑
τ=t+1
(
βτ − βτ+1)Et[dkτ ],
qkt = Dt
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt[dkτ ]
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, and for all k = 1, . . . , K.
Corollary 3.2 (Fix-Mix) If the conditional expected relative dividends of all
assets are event- and time-independent, i.e. if there exists a constant dk such that
Et[dkt+1] ≡ dk
for all k = 1, . . . , K, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, then
λ¯tk = d
k
for all k = 1, . . . , K and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Hence, if the expected relative dividends of all assets are event- and time-
independent, then in equilibrium all agents use the same stationary strategy for
their investment in the assets. That is, in each period t the proportion of wealth
invested into any asset k is the same, independent of the event at t and thus
independent of the investor’s wealth that is realized in t. This “fix-mix” strategy
is a generalization of Kelly’s (1956) “rule of betting” to multiple assets.
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For constant relative risk aversion different from 1 we obtain the following
result:
Theorem 3.2 If all investors have constant relative risk aversion η 6= 1 and if
they all have the same discount factor, i.e. βi = β for all i, then there exists a
unique competitive equilibrium (λ, q). This is an equilibrium with T-period fund
separation and it is given by
λ¯tk =
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt[ D
k
τ
(Dτ )η
]∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt[(Dτ )1−η]
,
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, k = 1, . . . , K, and
λt0 =
(
Dt
)1−η(
Dt
)1−η
+
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−t Et[(Dτ )1−η]
, (3)
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Equilibrium prices q are given by
qkt = (Dt)
η
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[
Dkτ
(Dτ )η
]
.
for all k = 1, . . . , K, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
The proof can again be found in Appendix A. We have the following corollary:
Corollary 3.3 (Fix-Mix) If there exists a constant dk such that
Et
[
Dkt+1
(Dt+1)η
]
Et
[
(Dt+1)1−η
] ≡ dk
for all k = 1, . . . , K, t = 0, . . . , T − 1, then
λ¯tk = d
k
for all k = 1, . . . , K and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
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Hence, as in the case of unit CRRA all agents invest according to a fix-mix
strategy in equilibrium, if dividends satisfy a certain stationarity requirement. A
particular case, where the condition of Corollary 3.3 is satisfied, is the one where
the dividend process is i.i.d. Corollaries 3.2 and 3.3 show that a basic insight from
portfolio choice theory, namely that CRRA implies a fix-mix investment strategy,
carries over to the case where asset returns are determined endogenously. This
result is surprising since asset returns need not be stationary in equilibrium3 and
hence it is not clear that a fix-mix strategy is optimal as it is in case of exogenous
asset returns.
Under logarithmic utility we have seen that there exists an equilibrium with
T-period fund separation even if agents have heterogenous time preferences. This
is not true for T ≥ 2 and CRRA different from 1, i.e. Theorem 3.2 does not carry
over to the case of heterogenous discount factors as it is shown by the following
example.
Example 3.1 Let I = K = T = 2 and let dividends be given by
D1(ξ0) = D
2(ξ0) = 0.5,
D1(ξu) = D
2(ξd) = 1,
D1(ξd) = D
2(ξu) = 0,
D1(ξuu) = D
1(ξdu) = D
2(ξud) = D
2(ξdd) = 1,
D1(ξud) = D
1(ξdd) = D
2(ξdu) = D
2(ξuu) = 0,
where ξ0 = {uu, ud, du, dd}, ξu = {uu, ud}, ξd = {du, dd}, ξuu = {uu},
ξud = {ud}, ξdu = {du}, ξdd = {dd} and F0 = {ξ0}, F1 = {ξu, ξd}, F2 =
{ξuu, ξud, ξdu, ξdd}. Let
pi(ξuu) = p1p2, pi(ξud) = p1(1− p2),
pi(ξdu) = (1− p1)p2, pi(ξdd) = (1− p1)(1− p2),
where 0 < p1 < 1 and 0 < p2 < 1. If p1 6= p2, i.e. if the dividends are not
identically distributed over time, then there does not exist an equilibrium with
T-period fund separation. To see this consider the case where p1 = 0.9 and
p2 = 0.1 and let η = 2, δ
1 = δ2 = 0.5, β1 = 0.1, β2 = 1. Assume by way of
3This is due to the fact that aggregate dividends Dt, which enter asset prices, need not be
stationary under the conditions of Corollaries 3.2 and 3.3.
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contradiction that there exists an equilibrium with T-period fund separation and
let λi be agent i’s investment strategy in this equilibrium. Then, for k = 1, 2,
there exists λ¯0k such that λ
i
0k = (1 − λi00)λ¯0k for i = 1, 2. Substituting this into
the first order condition (2) for agent i = 1 and solving for λ1 (using the market
clearing condition) we obtain the numeric solution λ¯01 ≈ 0.51. However, solving
agent 2’s first order condition gives λ¯01 ≈ 0.39 which is a contradiction. Hence, in
this example there does not exist an equilibrium with T-period fund separation.
♦
From the two-period case it is well known that equilibrium allocations are
Pareto efficient if the agents’ endowments are spanned and if agents have HARA
(hyperbolic absolute risk aversion) utility functions, such that each agent’s risk
tolerance exhibits the same slope. This result carries over to the multiperiod
model studied in this paper:
Theorem 3.3 (Effective Completeness) The consumption allocation (c∗i)i
corresponding to the equilibrium with T-period fund separation (λ∗, q∗) in Theo-
rem 3.1 and Theorem 3.2 is Pareto efficient.
The proof, given in Appendix A, is a simple computation showing that all
agents’ utility gradients are collinear at the consumption allocation correspond-
ing to the equilibrium with T-period fund separation. Effective completeness of
the asset market implies the existence of a representative investor whose portfo-
lio decision problem generates the equilibrium asset prices for the heterogenous
agents economy.
Theorem 3.4 (Representative Agent Equilibrium) Assume that the con-
ditions of Theorem 3.1, resp. Theorem 3.2, are satisfied and let (λ∗, q∗) be the cor-
responding equilibrium with T-period fund separation. Then there exists a repre-
sentative investor with expected utility function Uˆ : Rd++ → R, resp. Uˆ : Rd+ → R,
and endowment e¯ ∈ Rd++, where e¯t = Dt for all t = 0, . . . , T , such that equilibrium
asset prices in the representative agent economy are given by q∗.
If investors in the heterogenous agent economy have constant relative risk
aversion η, then Uˆ can be chosen to have expected utility form with the same con-
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stant relative risk aversion η. Moreover, Uˆ is independent of the future dividend
process (Dt)t=1,...,T .
Out of equilibrium the demand function of the representative agent is not
equal to the aggregate demand in the heterogenous agent economy, i.e. we do not
have demand aggregation in a strong sense. Nevertheless, by Theorem 3.4 the
demand function of the representative agent determines equilibrium asset prices
for any given future dividend process. Hence, we have demand aggregation in a
sense that is most relevant for asset pricing theory.
4 Empirical Results
In this section we provide an empirical test of the theoretical results derived
above. In particular, we test, whether stock prices indeed can be explained by
relative dividends as it is predicted by our model. Our empirical analysis differs
from previous studies in the literature on empirical dynamic asset pricing which
has concentrated on aggregate data instead of individual stocks. As part of our
empirical analysis we also estimate the consumers’ coefficient of risk aversion. In-
terestingly, our estimated coefficient is much closer to the risk aversion observed
in experimental studies (which is below 1) than to the risk aversion that was
found in tests of Lucas’ (1978) asset pricing model (which is at least 10).4
First, we give an outline of the estimation procedure. First–order conditions of
dynamic optimization problems with structural (deep) parameters θ usually are
formalized by expectations of a functional f of actual outcomes of state variables
and future instances of control variables xt,
xt = Et [f(xt+1, xt+2, . . . ; θ)] . (4)
To solve dynamic optimization problems numerically, Den Haan and Marcet
(1994) suggest to parameterize expectations by a linear or preferably nonlinear
function ψ parameterizing expectations by ω based on an information set Ωt,
Et [f(xt+1, xt+2, . . . ; θ)] = E [f(xt+1, xt+2, . . .), θ|Ωt] = ψ(Ωt;ω). (5)
4See for instance Kocherlakota (1996).
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Hence, determining expectations given the trajectories of the control and state
variables is simply a stochastic approximation problem,
min
ω
Σ(x, ω) = ‖f(·; θ)− ψ(·;ω)‖, (6)
where ‖·‖ denotes the euclidean norm which is calculated in data samples as mean
squared error. The solution to the dynamic problem (4) based on parameterized
expectations (5) and (6) is the fixed–point ωi−1 = ωi = ω¯ for large i of the
iterative map
ωi = (1− λ)ωi−1 + λ argminωΣ(xi−1, ω), i = 1, 2 . . . , ω0 ∈ R,
and
xi = ψ(xi−1;ωi),
where λ ∈ (0, 1] describes the rate of convergence. Den Haan and Marcet (1994)
find numerically that convergence is reached in models such as the neoclassical
growth model. To justify numerical convergence, we suggest to consider the p–
value associated with the null hypothesis H0 : ω
i(ψ(Ωt;ω
i−1)) = ωi−1. Although
the iteration only describes local convergence, Den Haan and Marcet (1994) claim
for many stochastic dynamic models that transversality conditions or the assump-
tion of time–invariant solutions ensure a unique solution in the above iterative
map.
Assuming that observed real world data is the outcome of the solution to the
dynamic model, i.e. the observed sample data of xt and f(·; θ) imply ωˆ = ω¯ , we
estimate the structural parameters of the latter as
θˆ = argminθ‖x− ψ(·; ωˆ)‖ s.t. ωˆ = argminωΣ(ω).
To put it in another way, we start the numerical solution problem with ob-
served time series, and are searching for the structural parameters of the dynamic
model that do not change the time series for the parameters given above.5
5In Woehrmann (2005) it is shown by simulations of the neoclassical stochastic growth model
of Kydland and Prescott (1982) that this inference approach to dynamic models is unbiased
and efficient.
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In our model deep parameters θ = (β, η) have to be estimated. Furthermore
we suppose dividends to follow a random walk implying actual dividends to be
best predictors of future dividends.6 Applying the inference scheme above to the
first order conditions of our dynamic model provided in Theorem 3.2, we solve
θˆ = argminθ‖q − qˆ‖
s.t.
qˆt = λ¯tk(Dt)
η
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−t(Dt)1−η
λ¯tk =
1∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−t(Dt)1−η
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tψ(ω)
ψ(ω) = polynomial conditional on dk,t and λ¯k,t
ωˆ = argminω‖(Dτ )1−η
(
λt+1,0d
k
t+1 + (1− λt+1,0)λ¯t+1,k
)− ψ(ω)‖
λt0 =
D
1−η
t
D
1−η
t +
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−t(Dt)1−η
,
where polynomials are estimated by ordinary least squares as in Den Haan
and Marcet (1994). Note, that qt and qˆt denote observed and estimated prices,
respectively. Estimations are conducted with quarterly data on the stocks of
the companies listed in Table 1. Among the 100 largest stocks with respect to
market capitalization in 2004 we have chosen those from the FAME data base,
which provide histories of at least 50 consecutive quarters of dividend payments.
Different from the large body of studies on dynamic asset pricing models based
on aggregate data, our model explains the stock market by relative dividends.
Hence, we report basic summary statistics of the latter in Table 1. Bottom line,
relative dividends of many stocks are normally distributed, but they are mostly
not stationary. Note that this is not assumed in our estimation scheme.
Results for the estimation of deep parameters θ are reported in Table 2. Note,
that convergence with regard to parameters ωi of the polynomial function as de-
scribed above is reached. We find that a coefficient of relative risk aversion
6This is verified — as in numerous papers — based on the ADF–test for unit roots.
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Table 1: Summary statistics for relative dividends.
JB and ADF denote the Jarque–Bera test for normality and the augmented
Dickey–Fuller test for unit roots, respectively.
Company Mean Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis JB p–value ADF p–value
3M 0.1320 0.0527 1.0383 3.5838 0.0079 0.5222
Altria 0.0832 0.0357 1.3748 5.2152 0.0000 0.4904
American Express 0.0275 0.0099 0.4960 2.2252 0.1920 0.2609
Bank New York 0.0225 0.0105 0.7649 2.7828 0.0831 0.0013
General Electric 0.0162 0.0082 1.4912 6.2053 0.0000 0.3815
General Motors 0.2442 0.1416 0.5259 2.4241 0.2236 0.0924
Hewlett Packard 0.0216 0.0104 0.1991 1.7377 0.1612 0.8243
Intel 0.0092 0.0079 2.0340 8.0703 0.0000 0.0925
IBM 0.1148 0.0637 -0.0605 2.0475 0.3828 0.7228
J. P. Morgan Chase 0.0551 0.0162 0.0284 2.2113 0.5213 0.5807
Johnson & Johnson 0.0335 0.0169 1.0705 3.0277 0.0084 0.2015
McDonalds 0.0190 0.0058 0.0588 2.1375 0.4542 0.3722
Merrill Lynch 0.0429 0.0261 0.6716 2.6040 0.1297 0.3116
Microsoft 0.0071 0.0057 0.2325 1.5908 0.1009 0.5072
Pfizer 0.0137 0.0096 0.6306 2.1112 0.0838 0.1695
United Technologies 0.0756 0.0415 0.6990 2.1477 0.0613 0.1880
Wachovia 0.0819 0.0352 0.3440 2.5655 0.5018 0.4982
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around 0.63 fits best, i.e., asset prices would suggest a weaker degree of risk aver-
sion than in the logarithmic case (CRRA=1). This is robust with respect to the
degree of the polynomial choosen in the estimation procedure. The null hypoth-
esis H0 : η = 1 can be rejected with low p-values of the Wald test. Given that
η ∼ N (0, σ), σ > 0, results of asymptotic theory give us (η−1)2
σˆ2
∼ F (1, T − 1),
which leads directly to a t–test for η frequently termed Wald–test. σˆ is obtained
by omitting once each data point. This finding contrasts with the asset pric-
ing literature working on aggregate data instead of individual stocks (cf. Mehra
and Prescott (1985) and Kocherlakota (1996), for example) which finds a much
stronger degree of risk aversion than in the logarithmic case. However, here we
focus on relative stock prices explained by relative dividends rather than consid-
ering the equity premium puzzle here.
Table 2: Estimation results of the structural parameters.
The degree of polynomial refers to ψ(·). RMSE stands for the root mean
squares error of q and qˆ. The null hypothesis of the Wald test is H0 : η = 1.
Polynomial βˆ ηˆ RMSE Wald p–value
2nd order 0.95 0.633 4.6887 0.000
3rd order 0.95 0.631 4.3445 0.000
Estimated time series of relative stock prices, qkt /q¯t for the 17 companies in
Table 1 are illustrated in the figures in Appendix B. The average R squared of
estimated relative stock prices is 70.65%, its standard deviation is 14.43%, and
they range between 42.77% and 96.88% indicating a good fit with the data.
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Appendix A: Proofs
General Considerations: In the following we derive the first order condition
(2) for the optimization problem (1). The first order condition for an interior
solution λi to (1) is given by
∂U i(ci(λi, q))
∂λik(ξt)
= αi(ξt),
for all k = 0, . . . , K, all ξt ∈ Ft and all t = 0, . . . , T−1, where αi(ξt) is a Lagrange
multiplier. Hence, for all k = 1, . . . , K, and all ξt ∈ Ft,
∂U i(ci(λi, q))
∂λi0(ξt)
=
∂U i(ci(λi, q))
∂λik(ξt)
.
∂U i(ci(λi, q))
∂λi0(ξt)
= wi(ξt)∂ξtU
i = βtipi(ξt)u
′
η(c
i(ξt))w
i(ξt),
7
where
∂ξtU
i :=
∂U i(ci)
∂ci(ξt)
.
Moreover,
∂U i
∂λik(ξt)
=
T∑
τ=t+1
∑
ξτ⊂ξt
∂ξτU
iλi0(ξτ )
∂wi(ξτ )
∂λik(ξt)
=
T∑
τ=t+1
∑
ξτ⊂ξt
βτi pi(ξτ )u
′
η(c
i(ξτ ))λ
i
0(ξτ )
∂wi(ξτ )
∂λik(ξt)
Let ξτ ⊂ ξt and let ξt+1, . . . , ξτ−1 be the unique predecessors of ξτ in periods
t+ 1, . . . , τ − 1. Then
∂wi(ξτ )
∂λik(ξt)
= wi0
Dk(ξt+1) + q
k(ξt+1)
qk(ξt)
τ−1∏
s=0
s6=t
[
K∑
k=1
Dk(ξs+1) + q
k(ξs+1)
qk(ξs)
λik(ξs)
]
= wi(ξt)
Dk(ξt+1) + q
k(ξt+1)
qk(ξt)
τ−1∏
s=t+1
[
K∑
k=1
Dk(ξs+1) + q
k(ξs+1)
qk(ξs)
λik(ξs)
]
=
wi(ξt)
wi(ξt+1)
wi(ξτ )
Dk(ξt+1) + q
k(ξt+1)
qk(ξt)
.
7Here and in the following we shortly write ci(ξt) instead of ci(λi, q)(ξt).
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Hence, the first order condition becomes
qkt =
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−ti Et
[
u′η(c
i
τ )
u′η(c
i
t)
wiτ
wit+1
λiτ0
(
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
)]
=
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−ti Et
[
u′η(c
i
τ )
u′η(c
i
t)
ciτ
cit+1
λit+1,0
(
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
)]
=
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−ti Et
[(
cit
ciτ
)η
ciτ
cit+1
λit+1,0
(
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
)]
,
for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and all k = 1, . . . , K, where Et[·] denotes the expectation
conditional on the sigma-algebra induced by the partition Ft. This proves (2).
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Proof of Theorem 3.1: The first order condition (2) for η = 1 reads
qkt =
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−ti Et
[
cit
cit+1
λit+1,0
(
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
)]
. (A.7)
If there exists an equilibrium with T-period fund separation, then, for all l and
all t there exists λ¯tl such that λ
i
tl = (1− λit0)λ¯tl for all i, which implies
qlt =
∑
j
λjtlw
j
t = λ¯tl
∑
j
(1− λjt0)wjt
and hence
cit
cit+1
λit+1,0 =
λit0w
i
t
wit+1
=
λit0∑
l
Dlt+1+q
l
t+1
qlt
λitl
=
λit0
1− λit0
∑
j
(1− λjt0)wjt
1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
,
where
q¯t :=
K∑
l=1
qlt for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
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Substituting this into (A.7) gives
λ¯tk =
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−ti
λit0
1− λit0
Et
[
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
.
Since
∑K
k=1 λ¯tk = 1 it follows that
λit0 =
1
1 +
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−t
i
=
1− βi
1− βT+1−ti
(A.8)
and λ¯tk = Et
[
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
,
for all i, for all k = 1, . . . , K, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. From
q¯t+1 =
∑
j
(1− λjt+1,0)wjt+1,
it follows that
qkt+1 = λ¯t+1,k q¯t+1
and hence
λ¯tk = Et
[
Dkt+1 + λ¯t+1,kq¯t+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
.
Therefore, it remains to solve for q¯t for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. For t = 0 we have
q¯0 =
∑
j
(1− λj00)wj0 =
∑
j
(1− λj00)(D0 + q0) δj θ¯ = (D0 + q¯0)
∑
j
(1− λj00) δj.
This implies
q¯0 = D0
∑
j(1− λj00) δj∑
j λ
j
00 δ
j
. (A.9)
Since
wjt+1 = (1− λjt0)wjt
∑
k
λ¯tk
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
qkt
= (1− λjt0)wjt
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
q¯t
= . . .
= wj0
t∏
τ=0
(
(1− λjτ0)
Dτ+1 + q¯τ+1
q¯τ
)
,
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it follows that
q¯t+1 =
∑
j
(1− λjt+1,0)wjt+1
=
t∏
τ=0
(
Dτ+1 + q¯τ+1
q¯τ
)∑
j
(
wj0
t+1∏
τ=0
(1− λjτ,0)
)
= (D0 + q¯0)
t∏
τ=0
(
Dτ+1 + q¯τ+1
q¯τ
)∑
j
(
δj
t+1∏
τ=0
(1− λjτ,0)
)
.
From
1− λit0 = βi
1− βT−ti
1− βT+1−ti
we compute
t+1∏
τ=0
(1− λiτ,0) =
βt+2i − βT+1i
1− βT+1i
,
and hence
q¯t+1 = (D0 + q¯0)
t∏
τ=0
(
Dτ+1 + q¯τ+1
q¯τ
)∑
j
(
βt+2j − βT+1j
1− βT+1j
δj
)
, (A.10)
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. From (A.10) we can solve for q¯t for all t and it is straight-
forward to verify that
q¯t = Dt
∑
j
(
βt+1j −βT+1j
1−βT+1j
δj
)
∑
j
(
βtj−βt+1j
1−βT+1j
δj
) , t = 0, . . . , T − 1,
solves (A.10) for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Given q¯t it follows that
λ¯tk = Et
[
Dkt+1 + λ¯t+1,kq¯t+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
=
∑
j
(
βt+1j −βt+2j
1−βT+1j
δj
)
∑
j
(
βt+1j −βT+1j
1−βT+1j
δj
)Et[dkt+1] +
∑
j
(
βt+2j −βT+1j
1−βT+1j
δj
)
∑
j
(
βt+1j −βT+1j
1−βT+1j
δj
)Et[λ¯t+1,k],
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for all k = 1, . . . , K, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Solving for λ¯tk recursively, we
obtain
λ¯tk =
1∑
j
(
βt+1j −βT+1j
1−βT+1j
δj
) T∑
τ=t+1
(∑
j
βτj − βτ+1j
1− βT+1j
δj
)
Et[dkτ ],
and qkt = λ¯tkq¯t = Dt
1∑
j
(
βtj−βt+1j
1−βT+1j
δj
) T∑
τ=t+1
(∑
j
βτj − βτ+1j
1− βT+1j
δj
)
Et[dkτ ]
for all k = 1, . . . , K, and all t = 0, . . . , T − 1. This proves the theorem.
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Proof of Theorem 3.2: Consider the first order condition (2) for the case
where βi = β for all i and η 6= 1. Let t = T − 1. Then, since λiT0 = 1, the
first order condition is identical for all investors i. Hence, λiT−1,k = λT−1,k for
all k = 0, . . . , K and for all i. By induction it follows that λitk = λtk for all
k = 0, . . . , K, for all i and all 0 ≤ t ≤ T − 1. For all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, and all
k = 1, . . . , K, define
λ¯tk = λtk/(1− λt0).
From the market clearing condition we get
qlt = (1− λt0)λ¯tl
∑
j
wjt = (1− λt0)λ¯tl
(
Dt + q¯t
)
, t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Substituting this into the first order condition (2) we get
λ¯tk =
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−t
(λt0)
η
1− λt0Et
[(
ciτ
wit
)1−η
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
.
For t = 0, . . . , T − 1, and τ = t+ 1, . . . , T ,
wiτ = w
i
t
τ−1∏
s=t
[
K∑
k=1
Dks+1 + q
k
s+1
qks
λisk
]
= wit
τ−1∏
s=t
Ds+1 + q¯s+1
Ds + q¯s
= wit
Dτ + q¯τ
Dt + q¯t
.
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This implies
λ¯tk =
(λt0)
η
1− λt0
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[
(λτ,0)
1−η
(
Dτ + q¯τ
Dt + q¯t
)1−η
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
(A.11)
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
We now solve for the equilibrium price q. We have already seen that
qkt = λ¯tk(1− λt0)
(
Dt + q¯t
)
,
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1. Summing over all k we get
q¯t = (1− λt0)
(
Dt + q¯t
)
⇐⇒ q¯t = 1− λt0
λt0
Dt, t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Substituting this into (A.11) gives
λ¯tk =
λt0
1− λt0
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[(
Dτ
Dt
)1−η
Dkt+1 + q
k
t+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
, for t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Summing over all k and solving for λt0 we obtain that
λt0 =
(Dt)
1−η
(Dt)1−η +
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt
[
(Dτ )1−η
] , t = 0, . . . , T − 1.
Hence,
λ¯tk =
1∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt
[
(Dτ )1−η
] T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[
(Dτ )
1−ηD
k
t+1 + q
k
t+1
Dt+1 + q¯t+1
]
=
1∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt
[
(Dτ )1−η
] T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[
(Dτ )
1−η (λt+1,0dkt+1 + (1− λt+1,0)λ¯t+1,k)] .
Solving backwards for λ¯tk gives
λ¯tk =
∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt[ D
k
τ
(Dτ )η
]∑T
τ=t+1 β
τ−tEt[(Dτ )1−η]
,
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for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1, k = 1, . . . , K. This implies that
qkt = λ¯tkq¯t
= λ¯tk(Dt)
η
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[
(Dτ )
1−η]
= (Dt)
η
T∑
τ=t+1
βτ−tEt
[
Dkτ
(Dτ )η
]
,
for t = 0, . . . , T − 1, which proves the theorem.
¤
Proof of Theorem 3.3: Let c∗i be investor i’s consumption in the equilib-
rium with T-period fund separation, (λ∗, q∗), as characterized in Theorem 3.1,
resp. Theorem 3.2. Then, for all t = 0, . . . , T − 1 and all i,
wit+1 =
δi
∏t
τ=0(1− λ∗iτ0)∑
j
(
δj
∏t
τ=0(1− λ∗iτ0)
) (Dt+1 + qt+1) = δi t∏
τ=0
(1− λ∗iτ0)Zt+1,
where Zt+1 is independent of i. This implies
c∗i0
c∗it+1
=
λ∗i00w
i
0
λ∗it+1,0w
i
t+1
=
λ∗i00(D0 + q¯0)
λ∗it+1,0
∏t
τ=0(1− λ∗iτ0)Zt+1
.
By Theorem 3.1, if η = 1, then λ∗it0 = (1− βi)/(1− βT+1−ti ) for all t. Hence,
λ∗i00
λ∗it+1,0
∏t
τ=0(1− λ∗iτ0)
=
1
βt+1i
,
which implies
βt+1i
c∗i0
c∗it+1
=
D0 + q¯0
Zt+1
,
and
∂ξt+1U
i(c∗i)
∂ξ0U
i(c∗i)
= βt+1i pi(ξt+1)
c∗i0
c∗i(ξt+1)
=
pi(ξt+1)(D0 + q¯0)
Z(ξt+1)
,
which is independent of i.
Let η 6= 1 and βi = β for all i. Then, by Theorem 3.2, λ∗it0 = λ∗t0 is independent
of i for all t. This implies wit+1 = δ
i(Dt+1 + q¯t+1). Hence,
c∗i0
c∗it+1
=
λ∗00(D0 + q¯0)
λ∗t+1,0(Dt+1 + q¯t+1)
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is independent of i. Therefore,
∂ξt+1U
i(c∗i)
∂ξ0U
i(c∗i)
= βt+1pi(ξt+1)
(
c∗i0
c∗i(ξt+1)
)η
= βt+1pi(ξt+1)
(
λ∗00(D0 + q¯0)
λ∗t+1,0(Dt+1 + q¯t+1)
)η
,
which is independent of i. Thus, in both cases the agent’s utility gradients are
collinear in equilibrium, ∇U i(c∗i) ‖ ∇U j(c∗j) for all i 6= j, which implies the
Pareto efficiency of the equilibrium allocation (c∗i)i.
¤
Proof of Theorem 3.4: Let (λ∗, q∗) be an equilibrium with T-period fund sep-
aration for the economy. Then, by Theorem 3.3 the corresponding consumption
allocation (c∗i) is Pareto efficient. Hence, the agents’ utility gradients ∇U i(c∗i)
are collinear, ∇U i(c∗i) ‖ ∇U j(c∗j) for all i 6= j. For all i = 1, . . . , I, define
γi :=
1
∂ξ0U
i(c∗i)
=
(
c∗i0
)η
.
If η = 1 define Uˆ : Rd++ → R by
Uˆ(c) := sup
{∑
i
γiU
i(ci)
∣∣∣∣∣ ∑
i
ci = c, ci ∈ Rd++ for all i
}
, c ∈ Rd++ .
If η 6= 1 define Uˆ : Rd+ → R accordingly. Then Uˆ(c¯) =
∑
i γiU
i(c¯i) if and only if
γi∇U i(c¯i) = γj∇U j(c¯j) for all i 6= j.
Moreover,
∇Uˆ(c¯) = γi∇U i(c¯i) for all i. (A.12)
Let e¯ ∈ Rd++ be given by e¯t = Dt for all t. Then, e¯ =
∑
i c
∗i and by definition of
Uˆ it follows that
Uˆ(e¯) =
∑
i
γiU
i(c∗i).
Hence, by (A.12) q∗ is an equilibrium price vector in the representative agent
economy, where the agent has utility function Uˆ and endowment e¯.
Since all U i are in expected utility form, Uˆ has expected utility form as well.
Consider first the case where all investors in the heterogenous agent economy
26
have unit constant relative risk aversion. Then it is straightforward to show that
Uˆ is given by
Uˆ(c) = E
[
T∑
t=0
(At +Bt ln(ct))
]
, for all c ∈ Rd++
where
At =
∑
i
γiβ
t
i ln(α
i
t) and Bt =
∑
i
γiβ
t
i ,
and αit = γiβ
t
i/
∑
j γjβ
t
j for all i and t = 0, . . . , T . Hence, a monotone transforma-
tion of Uˆ has expected logarithmic utility form and therefore, the representative
agent has unit CRRA.
Similarly, if all investors in the heterogenous agent economy have CRRA η 6= 1
and the same discount factor β, then Uˆ is given by
Uˆ(c) = E
[
T∑
t=0
Gt
1
1− η (ct)
1−η
]
, for all c ∈ Rd+,
where Gt = β
t
(∑
i(γi)
1
η
)η
for all t = 0, . . . , T . Hence, the representative agent
has CRRA equal to η.
Finally, observe that γi only depends on (βj, )j (δ
j)j and D0 for all i:
c∗i0 = λ
∗i
00w
i
0 = λ
∗i
00δ
i(D0 + q¯0) =
λ∗i00δ
i∑
j λ
∗j
00δ
j
D0.
If η 6= 1, then
γi =
(
c∗i0
)η
=
(
δiD0
)η
.
If η = 1, then
γi = c
∗i
0 =
1− βi
1− βT+1i
δi
(∑
j
1− βj
1− βT+1j
δj
)−1
D0,
Hence, Uˆ is independent of the future dividend process (Dt)t=1,...,T .
¤
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Appendix B: Figures
The following figures show the estimated time series of relative stock prices for
the 17 companies in Table 1.
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